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the expert. If, on the other hand, the court wishes to retain the
notion that expert witnesses be restricted to giving opinion testimony
only of scientific possibilities, a different test must be fashioned.
WILLIAM H. CANNON
Federal Jurisdiction-Non-Federal Ground Rule
The petitioner in Henry v. Mississippi' was convicted of dis-
orderly conduct. The conviction was based on corroborating evidence
which was admittedly obtained by unlawful means and in violation
of the state constitution.' This evidence constituted an essential
ingredient of the state's case, without which the petitioner could
not have been connected with the crime. At the trial, counsel for
the petitioner failed to object to the introduction of the corroborat-
ing evidence,- but a motion for a directed verdict was made at the
close of the state's case, which among other things specified that the
evidence had been illegally obtained.4 This motion was renewed at
the close of all the evidence." Petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi where the decision was initially reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial.' The court emphasized the plight
of out-of-state counsel unfamiliar with the procedural requirement
that the objection to illegally seized evidence must be made at the
time it is introduced.7 After the first opinion, the state filed a
Suggestion of Error which pointed out that the petitioner had in
fact been represented by competent local counsel. The Mississippi
Supreme Court then withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.' The court stated that honest mistakes
of counsel in respect to policy or strategy "are binding upon the
client as a part of the hazards of courtroom battle."'
-379 U.S. 443 (1965).
'Henry v. State, 154 So. 2d 289, 294 (Miss. 1963).
'Furthermore, the officer who was responsible for obtaining the evidence
was cross-examined concerning certain facts relating to its seizure. Ibid.
'For the text of the motion of a directed verdict, see Henry v. Missis-
sippi, 379 U.S. 443, 459-60 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 445.
e This opinion appeared in the Southern Reporter advance sheets at
154 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1963). For a criticism of the decision, see 35 Miss.
L.J. 109 (1963).
Henry v. State, supra note 6, at 296.
'This opinion appears in the bound volume of the Southern Reporter;
the volume and page number are the same as that of the first opinion. See
note 6 supra.
'Henry v. State, 154 So. 2d 289, 296 (Miss. 1963) (bound volume).
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Petitioner applied to the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari alleging that his constitutional rights had been
violated. The state contended that the failure of petitioner's counsel
to object to the introduction of the tainted evidence constituted an
adequate non-federal ground for the state decision, and hence, the
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review.'" The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and in a five-to-four decision1' vacated the
judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court and remanded the case
for a hearing on the question of "whether the petitioner is to be
deemed to have knowingly waived decision of his federal claim when
timely objection was not made to the admission of the illegally
seized evidence."' 2
The Court, in what must be regarded as dictum, stated that the
Mississippi contemporaneous objection rule served a "legitimate
state interest," and intimated that nothing else appearing, it would
have constituted an adequate non-federal ground which would pre-
clude review.13 While expressly declining to decide this question, the
Court gave two principal reasons for the remand. First, the Court
stated that there was some indication that petitioner's counsel de-
liberately bypassed the opportunity to make timely objection in the
state court for strategical or other reasons, in which case he would
be precluded from thereafter asserting the federal right, whether the
state ground be adequate or not.'4 Secondly, the Court stated that:
a dismissal on the basis of an adequate state ground would not
end this case; petitioner might still pursue vindication of his
federal claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding in which
the procedural default will not alone preclude consideration of
his claim, at least unless it is shown that petitioner deliberately
bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts.'5
The Court also implied that even if failure to comply with the
contemporaneous objection requirement alone would constitute an
adequate non-federal ground for decision, the motion for the directed
verdict might have substantially satisfied the purpose of the rule in
which case adherence to the rule would not serve a legitimate state
-0 379 U.S. 443, 446 (by implication).
' Justices Black, Harlan, Clark, and Stewart dissented.
12 379 U.S. 443, 446.
18Id. at 448.1 Id. at 449-50.
211 Id. at 452.
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interest.1" As stated by the Court, it "cannot be said to have frus-
trated the State's interest in avoiding delay and waste of time in
the disposition of the case.'1 7 This line of reasoning generated a
vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan which challenged the Court's
intimation that the trial judge should have to sift a general motion
for a directed verdict, which in most cases is filed as a matter of
course, to ascertain whether error had been committed in the entire
proceeding."
Although the remand of the case does not constitute a decision
on whether failure to comply with the Mississippi contemporaneous
objection rule is an adequate non-federal ground for the state court
decision, the Court's reasons for remanding the case signify the
continuance of a steady process of erosion of the non-federal ground
rule as a limitation on the Supreme Court's review of state court
decisions.
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789,"0 the principle has been em-
bedded in our concept of federalism, as it pertains to the judicial
system, that where a state court decision rests upon adequate and
independent state grounds it is not subject to correction by the
Supreme Court."0 Professor Wright describes the non-federal ground
rule as the "most important and most difficult limitation on Su-
preme Court review of state court decisions."'" The doctrine applies
to both state substantive22 and state procedural grounds.23 It is
usually said to be jurisdictional rather than dispositional,2 4 and al-
though the question is not entirely settled,25 it has been said that it
is derived from the Constitution's prohibition against advisory
opinions.2 6
10 Id. at 44849.
1 7 Id. at 449.
18Id. at 461.
19 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 85.
"
0Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590. See ROBERTSON
& KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 91 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951) [hereinafter cited as ROBERTSON &
KiRKHAMI; STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 3-31 (3d
ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as STERN & GRESSMAN]; WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 107 (1963) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
" WRIGHT § 107, at 425.
" Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
" Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1953).
24 Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458; Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground
in the Supreme Court, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1375 (1961).
" Compare Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590
(1875), with Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
"' The classic statement purporting to give the non-federal ground rule
constitutional status is:
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Before the Supreme Court will decline to review a state court
decision because of the presence of a non-federal ground, two in-
quiries must be made. First, it must be determined whether the
state court judgment or decree is based either exclusively or al-
ternatively on a non-federal ground." If there be a non-federal
ground in the state court decision, then it is the duty of the Court
to make an independent determination as to whether the asserted
non-federal ground is "adequate."2
To be an "adequate" non-federal ground, the basis of the state
court decision must be "broad" enough to sustain the state court
judgment;2 it must be "independent," 0 or sufficiently distinguish-
The reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought to warrant
statement. It is found in the partitioning of power between the state
and federal judicial systems and in the limitations on our own juris-
diction. Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to
the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power
is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not
permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment
would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of
federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an ad-
visory opinion.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). See Note, The Untenable
Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, supra note 24, at 1378.
"This question arises in four basic situations: (1) Where the state
court expressly bases its decision upon two grounds one of which is federal
and the other non-federal, the Court will determine if the non-federal ground
is adequate and independent. E.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S.
207 (1935). (2) Where the state court decision is based solely upon state
law, but a timely assertion of a federal claim was made, the Court will
determine if the non-federal ground is adequate; it is in no way bound by
the state court's determination. E.g., Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672
(1913). (3) Where both federal and non-federal questions are raised in
the record but the state court considers neither question, the Court will
usually presume that the decision rested on a non-federal ground and de-
cline to review. E.g., Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54
(1934). In some cases where the basis of the state court decision is am-
biguous, the Court has vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
the state court for clarification. E.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co.,
309 U.S. 551 (1940). (4) Where the state court expressly bases its judg-
ment upon the determination of the federal question, the Court will not
entertain a contention that the judgment might have been decided on a non-
federal ground. E.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 197
n.1 (1944). See generally ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM § 91; STERN & GR ss-
MAN § 3-32; WRIGHT § 107; Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in
the Supreme Court, supra note 24.
8 [T]he federal ground being present, it is incumbent upon this Court,
when it is urged that the decision of the state court rests upon a non-
federal ground, to ascertain for itself, in order that the constitutional
guaranties may appropriately be enforced, whether the asserted non-
federal ground independently and adequately supports the judgment.
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 (1931).
"' Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 636 (1875).
"Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157
19651
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able from the federal ground; and it must be "tenable."'" Of these
three standards of "adequacy," the concept of "tenability" is the most
difficult to demarcate." There is a conspicuous absence of any defin-
itive guidelines pervading the decisions on the question of the
"untenable non-federal ground.""3 It has been said that the state
ground must have "substantial basis" ;34 that it must not be "unfair
or unreasonable";" that it must not be "palpably unfounded" ;30
that it must not be "arbitrary or a mere device to prevent a review
of the decision upon the federal question" ;" and that it must be
"sufficiently well founded to furnish adequate support for the judg-
ment.' 3'  An examination of the language of the decisions shows a
noticeable display of illusiveness. Perhaps the only accurate general
statement that can be made about the concept of "tenability" is that
the state courts must not purposely utilize state law to evade federal
claims or prevent their review by the Supreme Court. Beyond this
very broad generalization what the Court will regard as "untenable"
depends largely upon the circumstances of the particular case.89
The doctrine of the adequate non-federal ground has been
termed a "doctrine supported by weighty considerations of law and
policy . . . the solid instrument of federalism. '40 Recently, this
"solid instrument of federalism" has been attacked from two sources,
one of which may be deemed direct and the other collateral.
(1917). "In such situations [involving a federal ground and a non-federal
ground] our jurisdiction is tested by inquiring whether the non-federal
ground is independent of the other and broad enough to sustain the judg-
ment." Id. at 164. The concepts of breadth and independence are hard to
distinguish in actual application and are often used to describe the same
requirement. See Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Suprene
Court, supra note 24, at 1382.
"
1Terre Haute & I.R.R. v. Indiana ex rel. Ketcham, 194 U.S. 579, 589
(1904). Cf. Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1919).
" See Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court,
supra note 24, at 1384-85 (1961). ROBERTSOx & KIRKHAM § 95.
8 Ibid.
8, Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S.
537, 543 (1930).
" Central Union Tel. Co. v. City of Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195
(1925).
soJohnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300, 307 (1890); see Leathe v. Thomas,
207 U.S. 93, 99 (1907).
"? Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157,
164 (1917).
38 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 475 (1918).
" See, e.g., cases cited in RoBERTsON & KIRKHAM §§ 97-103; cases cited
notes 34-38 supra.
"0 Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise
in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423, 435 (1961).
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The non-federal ground rule has been devitalized directly through
the court's application of the illusive concept of "tenability." This
devitalization has occurred primarily in the area of state procedural
law.4 ' It is a settled principle that the state has the right to pre-
scribe the procedural rules for invoking its jurisdiction.42 Failure
to comply with local procedure can be an adequate non-federal
ground for decision.3 Two relatively recent decisions demonstrate
how the Court's varying standard of "tenability" has been used to
strike down, as a bar to review, state grounds for decision predicated
upon failure to comply with state procedural requirements; there
was no apparent indication that the state courts in these decisions
acted evasively or arbitrarily in applying and adhering to their pro-
cedural rules.
In Williams v. Georgia,44 decided in 1955, the Supreme Court
held that where the Georgia courts had refused petitioner's extraordi-
nary motion for a new trial-a matter of discretion-because he
had not challenged the array of jurors when they were "put upon
him," the Court was not precluded from reviewing his constitutional
claim that the method of jury selection had deprived him of equal
protection of the laws. In respect to the state ground for the de-
cision the Court said: "[W]here a State allows questions of this
sort to be raised . . . as a matter of discretion, we are not concluded
from assuming jurisdiction and deciding whether the state court
action in this particular circumstance is, in effect, an avoidance of
the federal right."45 Thus, it would seem the Court left the door
open to strike down as an adequate state ground any discretionary
procedural rule for the airing of federal claims.40 Indeed, the Court
"See STERN & GRESSMAN § 3-33; ROBERTSON & KIRKHrAM § 103.
'2 Without any doubt it rests with each State to prescribe the jurisdiction
of its appellate courts, the mode and time of invoking that jurisdiction,
and the rules of practice to be applied in its exercise; and the state law
and practice in this regard are no less applicable when Federal rights
are in controversy than when the case turns entirely upon questions of
local or general law.
John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583, 585 (1913).
"" It is clear that this Court is without power to decide whether con-
stitutional rights have been violated when federal questions are not
seasonably raised in accordance with the requirements of state law. ...
Noncompliance with such local law can thus be an adequate state
ground for a decision below.
Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1953).
"349 U.S. 375 (1955).
"Id. at 383.
"See Note, 20 ALBANY L. REV. 46 (1956). The writer takes the posi-
1965]
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in Henry, although expressly declining to base its decision on
Williams, stated unequivocally that it stands for the above proposi-
tion.4
7
Another decision holding a state procedural default to be un-
tenable as a non-federal ground is Staub v. City of Baxley." In
that case, the Court held that a procedural rule requiring that each
section of an ordinance be specifically and separately attacked when
its constitutionality is challenged-in contrast to a blanket assertion
of unconstitutionality-to be untenable, and that a state dismissal
on these grounds would not preclude review. There was no inti-
mation that the state court had acted evasively, arbitrarily, or in-
tentionally to avoid the assertion and review of the federal claim in
applying its procedural rule. The Court set out the following cri-
terion: "To require . . . [petitioner] to count off, one by one, the
several sections of the ordinance would be to force resort to an
arid ritual of meaningless form."49 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dis-
senting, stated that "the relevance of a state procedure requiring
that constitutional issues be presented in their narrowest possible
scope is confirmed by the practice of this Court."5
These two decisions would seem to illustrate how seemingly
valid and purposeful state procedural rules have been emasculated
as adequate state grounds in accordance with illusive and poorly
defined standards. Henry would seem to be a continuation of this
practice in one important respect. The intimation that petitioner's
failure to comply with the Mississippi contemporaneous objection
rule might not be "adequate" to bar review simply because its pur-
pose might be served by another procedural device available later in
the trial-the motion for a directed verdict-is carrying the office
of the Court in determining adequacy to an unprecedented level.,1
It would seem that there must now be an examination of the total
tion that Williams "contains far-reaching and perhaps mischievous impli-
cations." Id. at 55.
"7 "We do not rely on the principle that our review is not precluded
when the state court has failed to exercise discretion to disregard the pro-
cedural default." 379 U.S. 443, 449 n.1 (1965).
" 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
,9 Id. at 320.50 Id. at 330.
" "[W]here the non-federal ground has fair support, we are not at
liberty to inquire whether it is right or wrong, but must accept it, as we
do other state decisions of non-federal questions." Enterprise Irrigation
Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917). See Note, 20
ALBANY L. REv. 46 (1956).
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state procedural system for presenting federal claims to ascertain
if one admittedly valid rule remains so in context of the total pro-
cedural system.
Perhaps the more troublesome and unmarked attack on the non-
federal ground rule has come about through the collateral effect of
the Court's decision in Fay v. Noia,2 where the non-federal ground
rule was held not to apply to federal habeas corpus proceedings.53
In other words, a procedural default in the state court, no matter
what its effect would be on direct review, will not preclude a
petitioner from coming into the federal courts, and ultimately to the
Supreme Court, through a habeas corpus proceeding.54 Although
the Court in Fay gave lip service to the non-federal ground rule as
a limitation on direct review,5 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, pre-
dicted that the decision would have grave consequences for the non-
federal ground rule and the federal system.56
Henry, coming only two years after Fay, is ample and con-
vincing proof that Mr. Justice Harlan's prophecy was not un-
founded. As already noted, one of the principal reasons for the
remand of the case in the presence of a seemingly adequate non-
federal ground was the ability of the petitioner to vindicate his
federal claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The only ap-
parent justification for this action was stated by the Court as fol-
lows: "By permitting the Mississippi courts to make an initial de-
termination of waiver, we serve the causes of efficient administra-
tion of criminal justice, and of harmonious federal-state judicial
S372 U.S. 391 (1963); see Comment, 42 N.C.L. REv. 352, 353-60
(1964).
" For a discussion of the Court's rationale in rejecting the adequate
non-federal ground rule see The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 62, 140-149 (1963).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1958) provides that "the writ of habeas corpus
shall not extend to a prisoner unless-he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States ... " See generally
WRIGHT § 53.
" "The fatal weakness of this contention [that the non-federal ground
rule applies to habeas corpus proceedings] is its failure to recognize that
the adequate state-ground rule is a function of the limitations of appellate
review." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429 (1963). For a discussion of
the controversy over whether the adequate non-federal ground rule is a
limitation on habeas corpus proceedings in the federal courts, see Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV.
L. REv. 1315 (1961) ; Brennan, supra note 40.
"' "This decision, both in its abrupt break with the past and in its conse-
quences for the future, is one of the most disquieting that the Court has
rendered in a long time." 372 U.S. 391, 448 (1963).
195
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relations."57 It is interesting to speculate what brand of federalism
strips an admittedly valid state procedural rule of its efficacy and
finality and forces a busy state court to reconsider a case which under
its own procedure-a procedure concededly designed to serve a
legitimate state purpose-had been heard and fairly determined.
In Fay v. Noia, Mr. Justice Harlan predicted that "the effect of
the approach adopted by the Court is, indeed, to do away with the
adequate state ground rule entirely in every state case, involving
a federal question, in which detention follows from a judgment.""8
It would seem that the Court in Henry, with its reliance on the
collateral effect of Fay, substantiates the warning by Mr. Justice
Harlan, and that a concept-by many thought basic to a federal
system-has in the course of two years been substantially diluted if
not fatally undermined.
RONALD W. HOWELL
jurisdiction-Collateral Attack-Bootstrap Doctrine
In the recent case of McKee v. Hassebroek,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a federal district
court decision allowing the heirs of a joint owner of United States
savings bonds to attack collaterally an Oklahoma probate court's dis-
tribution of those bonds as a part of the estate of the other joint ten-
ant. The joint tenants, husband and wife, had apparently agreed that
the bonds would be included in the husband's estate. The wife, who
was co-executrix of her husband's estate and devisee of a life estate
in his personal property, considered the bonds a part of his estate
and never asserted her own ownership, except as life tenant under
the will. After her death intestate, the wife's heirs-at-law gained
possession of the bonds, and the remaindermen under the husband's
will brought an action in the federal district court to recover them.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
" Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452 (1965).
"
8Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 469-70 (1963).
" It should be noted in this respect that the Court in Henry adopts the
same "waiver" concept as that set out by the Court in Fay-a deliberate
by-passing of state procedural rules. The fact that the Court relies on Fay
in applying this concept would seem to lend strong support to the con-
clusion that only the most flagrant procedural defaults will prevent a person
detained pursuant to a state judgment from asserting his federal claims either
on direct appeal or in a collateral habeas corpus proceeding.
1337 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1964).
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